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Hall: The Quantified Self Movement

THE QUANTIFIED SELF MOVEMENT: LEGAL
CHALLENGES AND BENEFITS OF PERSONAL BIOMETRIC
DATA TRACKING
Timothy S. Hall*
In 2009, Google revealed a "flu trends" feature on its website. 1
Using aggregate search data from its users, the search engine company
discovered that it could accurately detect seasonal influenza outbreaks
by comparing its algorithm's estimates of influenza outbreaks derived
from instances of health-related web searches with actual data from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.2 The individual searches of
millions of users of the World Wide Web, acting individually and with
no thought of coordination, produced a data set that, when interpreted
properly, generates a very useful tool for public health policymakers and
healthcare providers. 3
Others have developed social-media tools and techniques for
helping individuals achieve personal goals, such as weight-loss or other
health targets.4 These tools work on the premise that one is more likely
to achieve a goal, or stick to a plan, when others know about the goal
and when the individual is part of a larger community dedicated to
helping him or her achieve the goal.
The potential benefits of health-related data tracking and data
mining are vast and expanding. At the macro level, there can be benefits
in using the aggregated data of millions of individuals to predict health
risks and disease outbreaks. These data can potentially improve public
. Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Louisville Louis
D.
Brandeis School of Law. Thanks to Jim Chen for generous research support during his years as
Dean of the Brandeis School of Law, and to Lars Smith for helpful insights in discussion about this
and related topics.
1. Google Flu Trends, GOOGLE.ORG, http://www.google.org/flutrends/about/how.html (last
visited Aug. 11, 2014).

2. Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine Query Data,
457 NATURE 935, 1012-14 (2009).
3.

Id. at 1013-14.

4.

See, e.g., STICKK, http//www.stickk.com (last visited Aug. 11,2014).
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health responses to such outbreaks, save lives, and improve efficiency of
service delivery. At the same time, at the micro level, collecting,
sharing, and analyzing of individual health data can both improve health
outcomes for those involved in the data collection and provide those
individuals with a level of insight about their health-related behaviors
that is not easily achievable through other means.
We are currently in the midst of a convergence of personal
technology and health informatics. Advances in portable computing, the
near-ubiquity of the smartphone with its app-driven marketing structure,
the availability of high-speed mobile internet connectivity, and the rise
of "cloud-based" computing services - both data storage and data
processing, analysis, and mining - have enabled the emergence of a
cluster of health-related data collection and tracking apps, devices, and
services. These include nutritional tracking apps, weight management
devices and apps, pedometers which track the user's movement and
calculate the health effects of one's exercise (or lack thereof), wristbands
which purport to measure the quality of one's sleep, and others too
numerous to list here. This practice of personal data tracking and
analysis is often referred to as the "Quantified Self' movement, or as
"Life-Logging" or "Life-Hacking." 5 Currently, health-tracking apps
primarily rely on the manual input of data from the user, with some
exceptions. This is starting to change with the advent of devices that
measure health parameters directly from the individual user.6 However,
commentators predict that in the near future, there will be sensors perhaps implantable or wearable sensors - that will send streams of
biometric data from the individual user to a smartphone to create a
database of information to monitor potential adverse health events.7
These sorts of uses of mobile computers such as smartphones have not
gone unnoticed by makers of the devices. As of this writing, Apple
redesigned its flagship smartphone, the iPhone 5s, with a "motion
5. The "Quantified Self," "Life-Logging," or "Life-Hacking" movements and communities
are not limited to collection and aggregation of health data. One can find websites, apps, and online
discussions devoted to data-driven analysis of virtually every aspect of modem life: from workplace
productivity to personal confidence to memory improvement.
See, e.g., LIFEHACKER,
http://www.lifehacker.com (last visited Aug. 11, 2014). However, for purposes of this roundtable
on the intersection of healthcare law and intellectual property law, this article focuses on devices
and applications that collect health-related or biometric data.
6. See, e.g., Smart Body Analyzer, WITHINGS, http://www.withings.com/us/smart-bodyanalyzer.html (last visited Aug. I1, 2014) (the Withings wireless bathroom scale measures not only
weight, but also body fat and muscle mass percentages).
7. See ERIC TOPOL, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF MEDICINE 162-63 (2012) (describing
hypothetical nanosensor monitoring of patients' blood to detect markers of heart disease or cancers
for those at high risk of such diseases).
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coprocessor. '' 8 One of the stated purposes of including this specialty
chip in the iPhone is to enable increased use of the device for fitness and
health purposes, in part by reducing the load of such tracking programs
on the main processor, and thus battery life, of the device. 9
Proponents of these devices and apps both envision a near future in
which individuals will have a level of information about and control
over their daily lives unequalled in human history.l° They predict that
this unprecedented exercise of healthcare consumer autonomy will have
dramatic effects on the way in which healthcare is practiced, virtually
ending the practice of medicine as we know it. 1
This article explores some of the potential pitfalls associated with
collection of detailed individual biometric or health-related information,
and demonstrates that current laws and regulations are not well designed
to protect users of these devices and apps from unauthorized use or
misuse of their data. Health information is among the most sensitive,
intimate, and potentially damaging personal information one may
possess, and health policymakers have made health information privacy
a priority for decades for good reason. The Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was one of the major health
policy legislative achievements of the 1990s 1 2 However, HIPAA is of
no value for the protection of individually collected biometric data of the
sort discussed here.
HIPAA generally prohibits unauthorized disclosures of protected
health information except for a legitimate medical, business, or public
health use as defined in the statute and regulations. 3 However, there are
two problems with applying HIPAA to individually collected biometric
information. First, by its terms, HIPAA only applies to so-called
"Covered Entities."'14 While health plans, healthcare providers, and
healthcare clearinghouses must follow HIPAA regulations, companies or
others who aggregate individuals' biometric data as part of a health
behavior tracking app are not "Covered Entities" under HIPAA, as they
8.

iPhone 5s Tech Specs, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone-5s/specs/ (last visited Aug.

11,2014).
9. See Matthew Miller, Apple iPhone 5s review: The Best Gets Better, ZDNET (Nov. 12,
2013), http://www.zdnet.com/apple-iphone-5s-review-the-best-gets-better-7000023092/.
10. See TOPOL, supra note 7.
11. Id. at 178-95.
12. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-91, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
HIPAA].
13. See id. at § 1173(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-2 (Westlaw through P.L. 113-25 (excluding
P.L. 113-21)).
14. Id.
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are not healthcare providers. 15 Second, HIPAA was written to apply
primarily to medical records generated by "Covered Entities."' 6 As a
result, the definition of "[i]ndividually identifiable health information"17
in HIPAA is written to apply only to medical and billing records.
Thus, disclosure of individually identifiable biometric data by the
company that manufactures the device, sells the app, or runs the website
aggregating the data does not violate HIPAA's Privacy Rule as it
currently stands.
Another potential source of regulation of devices and apps
involving healthcare or medical uses is the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). The FDA recently issued a Guidance regarding
the agency's approach to "mobile medical apps."' 8 Although this
document makes clear that the FDA is aware of the current boom in
individually generated biometric information, the FDA does not
currently plan to exercise its regulatory authority over many of the
health-related apps currently on the market.' 9
The FDA Guidance establishes three categories of what it refers to
as "mobile apps.",20 These categories are:
1. Apps that connect to a medical device to control the device
or acquire data from the device;
2. Apps that "transform the mobile platform into a regulated
medical device . . . including functionalities similar to those of

currently regulated medical devices;" and
3. Apps that provide analysis, diagnosis or
2
recommendations specific to an individual patient. '

treatment

Such mobile apps will not fall under the current regulatory
authority of the FDA because they do not meet the definition of a
"medical device. 22 Also, even if a mobile app does meet the definition
15.
45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102-103 (2014). Even if they were healthcare providers, HIPAA
protections only attach when a healthcare provider transmits health information electronically in
connection with certain types of transactions. Id. at § 160.103.

16.

Id.

17. Id.
18. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDICAL
APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2013)
[hereinafter FDA Guidance].
19. Id. at 24 n.32.
20. Id. at 4 (defining "mobile apps" as "software applications intended for use on mobile
platforms").
21. ld. at 14-15.
22. Id.
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of a "medical device," the FDA will not exercise its regulatory authority
over those apps because of the low risk they present to the public. 3
Finally, the FDA Guidance describes a category of mobile apps which
are "medical devices" and which "pose a risk to the patient's safety if
the mobile app were to not function as intended" 24 that the FDA does
intend to regulate as medical devices. The
FDA refers to these regulated
25
apps as "mobile medical applications.,
The computing platform upon which a mobile app is executed is
not a medical device manufacturer and will not be regulated by the
FDA.26 Similarly, the websites through which apps for these devices are
sold, such as the Apple App Store or Google Play, are27not considered
manufacturers subject to the FDA's regulatory authority.
Thus, while some apps that enable the collection of individually
generated biometric information may also fall under the regulated
category of "mobile medical apps," many more likely will not.
Specifically, the FDA states that it does not currently intend to exercise
regulatory authority over apps that "[p]rovide patients with simple tools
to organize and track their health information. ' '28 More specifically, the
types of apps over which the FDA intends to "exercise enforcement
discretion" are listed in an appendix to the FDA Guidance. 29 These
include many common health-tracking apps such as:
Mobile apps that provide patients a portal into their own health
information, such as... historical trending and comparison of
vital signs;
Mobile apps that allow a user to collect blood pressure data and
share this data through email, track and trend it, or upload it to a
personal or electronic health record; [and]
Mobile apps that are intended for individuals to log, record,
track, evaluate, or make decisions or behavioral suggestions
related to developing or maintaining general fitness, health or

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25. Id.
at7.
26. Id.at 10 ("[11f it is possible to run mobile medical apps on BrandNamePhone but
BrandNamePhone is not marketed by BrandNameCompany as intended for use as a medical device,
then BrandNameCompany would not be considered a mobile medical app manufacturer or a
medical device manufacturer.").
27.

Id.atlO-11.

28.
29.

Id.at 16.
Id. at 24 n.32.
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30

It is apparent that, while certain apps will be regulated as medical
devices, 3 1 many apps that allow collection, tracking, and sharing of
personal health information will not. The FDA's regulatory focus is on
the clinical functioning of the medical device app, not on protection of
users from potential misuse of sensitive health and wellness information
that may be generated, stored, tracked, or shared by such devices.
Although the FDA may in the future decide to expand its exercise of
regulatory authority over a wider array of health-related apps, FDA
regulation today does not constitute a meaningful regulation of the data
streams generated by the vast majority of these apps.
Turning from federal regulation to private law, unauthorized
disclosure of individually generated biometric information may be a
breach of contract between the device maker or app provider and the
user. Can a user of the health behavior app or device make a claim for
unauthorized disclosure of the data stream or database generated by that
device? A comprehensive review of terms of service for health-tracking
apps and devices is beyond the scope of this article. However, the terms
of use of one of the most popular devices currently on the market, the
FitBit range of "activity trackers," impose on the company only the
obligation to adhere to the privacy settings selected by the user within
the FitBit web site interface. 32 To the extent that the company fails to
comply with the privacy settings selected by the user, a claim for breach
of contract might lie. However, any such claim would be subject to the
usual problems of proof of damages in contract cases, as well as to the
foreseeability limitation on damages first articulated in the classic case
of Hadley v. Baxendale, which limits consequential damages in breach
contemplation of the
of contract cases to those damages within the
33
into.
entered
was
contract
the
parties at the time
If the information is intentionally taken by a third party, such as a
malicious computer hacker, the user might assert a claim for conversion
of his or her property. However, many jurisdictions do not permit a
30.

Id.

31. An example of one such app is the AliveCor ECG device and associated app, which is a
portable heart monitor that has been approved by the FDA. This device allows smartphone tracking
of cardiac data and, through a companion app created by the University of Southern California, can
link the user's heart rate to photographs taken with the smartphone. Timothy J. Seppala, AliveCor
ECG comes to Android, ENGADGET (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.engadget.com/2013/10/04/alivecor-

android-ecg-biogram/.
32. Website Terms and Conditions, FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com/terms (last updated Dec.
15, 2011).
33. See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Exch. 341, 354.
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claim for conversion of intangible property. 34 In the few jurisdictions
that do recognize such a claim, however,
that claim still may not be
35
available for the sort of data at issue here.
New York recognized a cause of action for conversion of computer
data in Thyroff v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co..36 In Thyroff, an insurance
agency repossessed a computer leased to its agent upon termination of
the agency agreement.3 7 The computer contained personal data,
including emails, in addition to business data. 38 The agent sued for
conversion of the personal data contained in the computer. 39 The Court
of Appeals of New York agreed with the agent that the tort of
conversion should be modernized to cover intangible property such as
computer data. 40 However, the data in Thyroff existed only on the single
computer.4 ' It was not "in the cloud." Thus, when Nationwide
repossessed the computer, it deprived Thyroff of the ability to access the
data.4 2 The court's discussion of conversion in Thyroff does not make
clear whether the court would agree that taking a copy of data, while
leaving the original database still accessible to the user, would constitute
conversion. For this reason, one cannot definitively say that a theft of
personally identifiable biometric data from an app or website would be
actionable as conversion.
Professor Lars Smith considered an analogous problem in his 2006
article, RFID And Other Embedded Technologies: Who Owns the
Data?43 Professor Smith, writing before the rise of individually
collected biometric data, considered the problem of data contained in
radio frequency identification (RFID) tags and read by RFID scanners.44
Among other theories, he asks whether the theft of such data constitutes
a violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).45
Professor Smith concludes that while a violation of the ECPA may occur

34.

See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Lockwood, 311 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1150-51 (D. Kan. 2004)

(denying conversion claim for alleged interception and decryption of satellite signals).
35.

See, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Lynch, 822 F. Supp. 2d 803, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2011)

(denying conversion claim for television programming).
36.
37.

Thyroffv. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1273 (N.Y. 2007).
Id.

38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1278.

41.

Id.

42.

Id. at 1273.

43.
Lars S. Smith, RFID and Other Embedded Technologies: Who Owns the Data?, 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 695,696 (2006).

44.

Id. at 700-02.

45.

Id. at 751-54.
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if a third party intercepts the transfer of data between the device and the
database, the data otherwise generated by the device is probably not an
"electronic communication" for purposes of the ECPA.46 If the data are
not in transit, the information is not protected by the ECPA.47 In
addition, there is another potential hurdle to even this limited protection:
the ECPA explicitly exempts "tracking devices. 48 A "tracking device"
is defined as "an electronic or mechanical device which permits the
tracking of the movement of a person or object., 49 While not applicable
to apps that require manual input of the relevant data, mobile biometric
may be
data collection devices, such as FitBit "activity trackers,
tracking devices under the ECPA and thus not covered by its provisions
at all.
Much has been written about the changing perceptions of privacy in
the digital age. Those of us in law school administration and student
services have seen the potential dangers of such over-sharing when
information damaging to the reputations of our students is accessed by
potential employers or even bar admissions officials. In the quantified
Some
self-movement, there are diverse approaches to privacy.
quantified self-advocates favor a curtailment of privacy (or perhaps a
formal recognition that privacy rights on the Internet are in fact seriously
curtailed), articulating a version of the "information wants to be free"
meme. 51 Others take a more measured approach, trying to articulate
standards and expectations for online and cloud-computing privacy. It is
not unreasonable to believe that many users of biometric tracking apps
and devices have higher expectations of privacy than current law
provides.
Privacy may also be invaded through demands of law enforcement.
Unlike the privacy issues discussed above, these privacy issues are
governed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.52 With
respect to Fourth Amendment claims arising out of disclosure of
individually collected biometric data, the Third Party Disclosures
doctrine might be interpreted to provide no protection to data stored on
46. Id. at 752-54.
47. Id. at 754.
48. Id. at 752-53 nn.285-87 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(12)(C), 3117(b) (2000)).
49. Id.
50. See FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com (last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
51. See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 999 n.14 (2003) (attributing the quote to Stewart
Brand).
52.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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third party servers or "in the cloud., 53 The Third Party Disclosures, or
"Knowing Exposure," doctrine provides that information which has been
voluntarily disclosed to a third party is no longer subject to a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 54 In 2010, Professor Christopher Slobogin noted
that "[t]o date, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment has [both] failed to anticipate [the technological] revolution
and continued to ignore it."' 55 Recognizing that modem Fourth
Amendment "search" jurisprudence started, in Katz v. United States,
from the premise that non-physical interception of intangible
communication could constitute a "search,, 5 6 Professor Slobogin
demonstrates that subsequent reliance by the Court on the "reasonable
expectations of privacy" test has "pretty much limited [Katz] to its
facts." 5 7 The key problem for purposes of this article is language in Katz
which states that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection., 58 When Katz is read in light of subsequent decisions
involving bank records and telephone systems, the conclusion drawn
from Professor Slobogin's work is that it is highly unlikely that personal
data stored on third party servers (that is, virtually all of the personal
biometric data stored "in the cloud" and accessed via mobile devices)
will be afforded Fourth Amendment protections against governmental
search and examination.
Finally, we turn from unauthorized disclosure to authorized, even
desired, disclosure and examine how even this may have troubling
consequences. Many decisions affecting an individual, including but not
limited to decisions about employment and insurability, may turn in part
on information about the individual's health status. The availability of
detailed personal biometric data about oneself may lead to a system in
which there are incentives for what we might call "proverse selection" in
information disclosure. 59 Proverse selection is the opposite of the more
53.
(2009).
54.

See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563
Id.

55. Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age?, in
CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 12 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes
eds., 2011).

56.
57.
58.

Id. at 13 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
Id.
Id. at 14 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).

59. See Scott Peppet, The Quantified Self: Personal Choice and Privacy Problem?,
CONCURRING
OPINIONS
(NoV.
16,
2010),

http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/11/the-quantified-self-personal-choice-andprivacy-problem.html.
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familiar "adverse selection" problem in which individuals who know or60
suspect that they will need insurance are more likely to apply for it.
Adverse selection can skew an insurance pool such that premiums
collected are not sufficient to pay claims. This leads to the classic
insurance "death spiral" in which rising premiums chase rising claims
until the insurer is bankrupted. 61
Proverse selection works somewhat differently and operates as an
incentive to reveal positive information about one's risk profile, even if
not required (or, sometimes, even if prohibited). Even if not required by
employers, might prospective employees want to share positive
information about themselves? Might applicants for health insurance or
life insurance want to demonstrate to prospective issuers that they in fact
represent good risks? 62 Auto insurance customers are already given
incentives by at least one insurer to allow that insurer to collect data on
their driving habits. 63 Ultimately, if enough applicants for jobs or
insurance are voluntarily offering positive information, this leads to an
inference of negativity on the part of those not disclosing, even if that
inference is unwarranted.
Ethicists and commentators have championed the "right not to
know" in another health information context - that of genetic testing.
While genetic testing may reveal useful information, it may also reveal
information that is unusable, or that causes more anxiety or stress than is
warranted.
In extreme cases, knowledge of a potential, though
unquantified, genetic risk may lead individuals to make poor medical
treatment decisions. Although the collected data are of a different sort,
the "right not to know" information, which may cause undue stress,
anxiety, or even harm to certain individuals, should be taken as seriously
in this context as in the genetic testing context.
This last concern about individual biometric tracking may seem farfetched or unlikely, but so do some of the claims made for such data
collection by its proponents. If the positive claims of writers such as

60.

See Robert H. Jerry, 11, Health Insurer's Use of Genetic Information: A Missouri

Perspective on a ChangingRegulatory Landscape, 64 MO. L. REv. 759, 770-71 (1999).
61. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat,
113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1223-24 (2004).

62.
63.

See Peppet, supra note 59.
See Becky Yerak, Devices Map Your Driving Habits, can Help Save Money on Insurance

Premiums, CHICAGO

TRIBUNE,

Sept.

23,

2012,

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-

23/business/ct-biz-0923-telematics-20120923_1 _biggest-auto-insurers-insurance-products-claimscosts. Progressive Insurance reports more than $1 billion in policies were written using their
SnapShot tracking device in the most recent fiscal year. Id.
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Eric Topol are to be taken seriously, 64 then we should also take seriously
the potential negative consequences of such a dramatic realignment of
our current expectations and practices of healthcare data collection and
service delivery. Perhaps one day the main source of health data will not
be collected via large diagnostic machines in our doctors' offices and
hospitals, but via nanosensors in our bloodstreams interacting wirelessly
with the computers in our suit pockets. In 1890, Brandeis and Warren
defined the right of privacy as the "right to be let alone." 65 Perhaps
Brandeis' "right to be left alone" should be reconceptualized for the
digital, cloud-driven, over-measured future as a "right to be
unquantified."
Individualized biometric data tracking and analysis, while still in its
infancy, holds great promise for improving both individual health and
public health. However, as with other technological advances, the law
may not keep up with technological capabilities without intentional
intervention by scholars, legislatures, and courts. Existing common law
and statutory law governing privacy in both electronic communication
and healthcare data are not sufficient to ensure protection of individually
collected biometric data. While some commentators decry emphasis on
privacy as outmoded in light of new technologies, this article takes the
position that the law should not force this loss of privacy on users of this
technology, but should endeavor to protect a sphere of privacy from
which individuals may depart of their own informed consent. Although
concrete proposals for reform are beyond the scope and the allotted
space of this essay, the need for attention to such reforms should be
apparent.

64. See TOPOL, supra note 7.
65. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193-205 (1890).
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